

## COALITION

# CLOSE-UP

Newsletter of the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy Summer 1985

### Trident D-5 Alters Military Balance

by Howard Morland,  
Disarmament Coordinator

Of all the weapons involved in the nuclear arms race, only one will alter the military balance during the next fifteen years. It is not the MX, it is not star wars, and it has nothing to do with continued underground nuclear warhead testing. It is not cruise, not the B-1 bomber, and not Pershing 2. It is not anything the Russians are building.

It is the Trident D-5 missile, a new ballistic missile designed to replace the existing C-4 missile on the Trident submarine. The D-5 is also called the Trident 2. Its increased accuracy and explosive power will enable the Trident submarine to destroy underground ICBM silos in the Soviet Union.

The most critical measure of the military balance is second-strike capability—the ability to absorb an all-out nuclear attack and retaliate. Today each superpower has several thousand "survivable" warheads in its second-strike force. On the U.S. side, the survivable warheads are on submarines at sea and on bombers ready to take off. In other words, they are deployed by the sea and the air legs of the "triad." U.S. ICBM silos, the land leg of the triad, are theoretically vulnerable to Soviet attack, but U.S. submarines and bombers on alert are not threatened by anything the Russians are likely to deploy in this century. The U.S. second strike force is secure.

The Soviet situation is different. The Soviet Union's few submarines at sea are vulnerable to the U.S. Navy's anti-submarine capability; the rest are sitting

(like  
MIRV;  
other  
targets  
my own  
line  
discussion!)



'ACTUALLY, AFTER FORTY YEARS, I RARELY GIVE IT A THOUGHT...'

ducks in part. The Soviet bomber force is small and vulnerable. Only the land leg of the Soviet triad is survivable, and that leg will be threatened by the D-5 missile.

Other weapons are relatively unimportant. Public opposition to the MX has forced its projected numbers well below the first-strike threshold. It would take three or four thousand highly accurate warheads to destroy the 1398 Soviet ICBM silos, plus command centers, bomber bases, and submarine parts. The MX program now calls for deployment of only 500 warheads. The star wars program will not deploy hardware during this century, with the possible exception of anti-satellite weapons which do not affect either side's second-strike capability. Ground- and sea-launched cruise and Pershing 2 missiles are not numerous enough; and air-launched cruise missiles, while numerous enough, are too slow for surprise attack.

That leaves the D-5, the weapon moderates in Congress love to promote as an alternative to the MX. It will be

deployed as close to Russia as the Pershing 2, it will have the accuracy of the MX, and it will be as numerous as the air-launched cruise. With 3800 warheads deployed, it will be the only first-strike weapon which meets both the qualitative and the quantitative criteria to credibly threaten a disarming first strike. The first batch of D-5 missiles could be authorized next spring and deployed, at the rate of 48 missiles and 384 warheads per year, starting in late 1989.

On June 19, the House of Representatives debated the merits of the D-5 missile for the third time in four years. An amendment to halt the advanced procurement of missile parts was voted down 342 to 79. It was the worst showing yet for opponents of the D-5 in the House; the Senate has never had a vote or a debate on it. Since all new Trident submarines are now being built with D-5 missile launch equipment, D-5 opponents will now have to contend with the argument that there is no other missile suitable for the new submarines.

\*\* except entirely from SU D-5!

\* and comparison to "1st strike cap" —  
variously measured.

\*\* But do affect water's

DECP

FS Card; and now Paragon SS: Kilmer, PII, CM

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\* NOT QUIT: DEPENDS ON NUMBERS (e.g. ...)

\* Continued congressional support for the D-5 missile is nothing less than a commitment to acquire a disarming first-strike capability. A bankrupt strategic doctrine sometime called the "stability of instability" is the official justification for building the D-5. The theory holds that if Soviet leaders believe we might strike first and destroy their retaliatory capability, they will be deterred from challenging the status quo anywhere in the world, particularly in Europe or the Persian Gulf. The counter-argument is that if the Russians fear a first strike they might panic and strike first themselves.

It is probably too late to stigmatize the D-5 missile as a bad missile and make opposition to it into a litmus test on the peace issue. The Coalition's year-long campaign on the D-5 may have even backfired. Eleven new converts were made in the House, but nineteen House members who voted against the D-5 last year switched and supported the missile this year. Our efforts to show how essential the D-5 is in the quest for U.S. nuclear superiority may have persuaded a dozen or more liberals to vote for it this year.

For whatever reason, the political reality in Washington is that voting against the D-5 is tantamount to voting against "everything." By definition, lawmakers who do that have no "credibility," and they therefore are not likely to be joined by their moderate colleagues. (Apparently, facts and logic have little to do with credibility.) The national press seems determined to treat the D-5 as a non-issue, since the controversy about it in Congress is so lapsed.

So where does that leave us?

US- To same extent, we must now depend on the Soviet Union to preserve nuclear stability by building mobile missiles and lessening its dependence on silo-based ICBMs. Ironically, this is precisely the stated goal of the Reagan administration in the Scowcroft Commission Report of 1983, which calls for "encouraging stability by giving incentives to move toward less vulnerable deployments." In the nuclear version of destroying the village in order to save it, our government is (supposedly) destroying stability (i.e., mutual second-strike capability) in order to encourage its development in another, more expensive form, after another round of the arms race. On the other hand, the stated goal of encouraging stability may simply be insincere.

\* We should thank congressional opponents of the D-5 for their courage and urge them to work for some kind of limit on D-5 deployments. The easiest limit would be a prohibition on use of D-5s in the first eight Trident submarines, all of which now carry C-4 missiles. Another limit would be a prohibition on use of the D-5's new 475 kiloton warhead. Forcing the D-5 missile to carry the smaller 100 kiloton warhead which the C-4 uses would reduce the first-strike potential of the D-5. But even that will not happen until Congress stops trying to win the arms race. Somehow, the lesson must eventually be learned that nuclear superiority is neither practical nor desirable. With our own second-strike force secure for the foreseeable future, the United States is in a strong position to take the initiative for peace.

\* DEPENDS ON NUMBERS

# UPDATE

## Central America

It has been a very difficult year for critics of U.S. foreign policy in Central America. The year has been characterized as much by the stunning silence on El Salvador as by the stunning reversal in Congress on the issue of U.S. aid for the Nicaraguan contras. It has also been a year which has witnessed U.S. Green Beret Special

Forces arrive in Costa Rica with machine-guns, mortars, and anti-tank weapons in order to train 750 of that country's Civil Guardsmen. It has been a year during which more than 11,000 U.S. troops have participated in training exercises in Honduras, many taking place only a few miles from the Nicaraguan border. And it has been the year in which Congress appears to be preparing to grant \$10 million in military aid to Guatemala.



Final consideration of the Fiscal Year 1986 Foreign Aid Authorizations Bill coincided with the TWA hijacking and the killing of four U.S. Marines in El Salvador. The not unnatural congressional outrage over these events, however, led the House of Representatives to approve a foreign aid bill known as the "macho" bill, heralding the acceptance of the "Reagan doctrine" which conservative Rep. Weber (R-MN) defined as the willingness to "support resistance movements around the world." In that bill the House not only approved \$27 million in nonlethal military aid for the contras, but repealed the 1976 ban on U.S. covert operations in Angola (the Clark Amendment). And with virtually no debate, it voted to exempt the Salvadoran government from the 1974 ban on U.S. funds being used for police training. This law, known as Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, prohibited U.S. police training worldwide because of its connection with torture and interrogation techniques practiced by foreign police forces. Earlier this year, Congress has already granted one waiver for El Salvador in order to permit the U.S. to train a Salvadoran "anti-terrorist" SWAT-team unit, consisting of members of El Salvador's notorious Treasury police and other law enforcement agencies. According to the Washington Office on Latin America, the new across-the-board waiving of Section 660 for El Salvador by the Congress "will have given the green light for all police training thereby opening another spigot for military aid at a time when what is needed is forceful advocacy of a political solution to El Salvador's civil war" (Latin America Update, WOLA, July/August 1985).

### Gearing Up for "Retaliation"

The actions of Congress have taken place against a background of presidential rhetoric which sounds less and less like mere psychological warfare. Indeed, as John B. Oakes, former Senior Editor of the New York Times, recently stated: "With his most recent charges of 'terrorism' against the Sandinistas, Mr. Reagan is clearly attempting to build a legitimate case for an illegitimate purpose: provoking the overthrow by force of a left-wing Government that . . . represents no realistic threat to the security of the United States or of this hemisphere . . . What else could Mr. Reagan be leading up to when he accused 'the Communist regime in Nicaragua' of being a 'terrorist' state, 'engaged in acts of war' against the American people? Or what else could his State Department be leading up to when, without credible evidence, it

0: MAD: SAFER (STABLER) THAN ANY FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE



accused the Sandinistas of responsibility for the killing of Americans in Son Solvador and for prospective killings that have not yet occurred in Honduras . . . It sounds much more like a calculated effort to whip up American public opinion to back the overt military overthrow of the Sandinista regime—as though we had learned nothing in the 50 years since the Marines were last in Nicaragua." (NYT, 8/5/85)

Further, on July 15, 1985, the prestigious human rights monitoring group, the Americas Watch Committee, released a 90-page report which charges that the Reagan administration has been "deceptive and harmful" in depicting the human rights situation in Nicaragua to the point of "debasement" worldwide: "Such a concerted campaign to use human rights in justifying military action is without precedent in U.S.-Latin American relations, and in effect is an unprecedented debasement of the human rights cause."

In addition to the exaggeration and hysteria surrounding administration rhetoric on Nicaragua as regards terrorism and human rights issues, recent reports have documented a tremendous military and strike capability which has been built up in the U.S. Southern Command in Panama as a direct response to U.S. policy towards Nicaragua (NYT, 6/4/85 and 6/5/85). In these same reports, U.S. military officials describe an invasion of Nicaragua to be "like falling off a log." Increasingly, top officials speak about or make mention of "the agonizing choice" the U.S. might face of sending U.S. forces into the region, such as Secretary of State Shultz's speech before the American Bar Association on May 23rd. Indeed, following the murders of the marines in El Salvador, the administration seriously considered a so-called surgical air strike against one or more military bases or training camps in Nicaragua.

### Turning Point

The question many congressional analysts are now asking is whether these recent congressional actions reflect a short-term response to a variety of domestic and international events; or whether they indicate a more profound shift towards a renewed interventionist foreign policy on the part of Congress. Certainly one test will be faced this fall when Congress decides whether to renew restrictions on C.I.A. operations in Nicaragua or to let all restraints expire in September.

But the proof will be seen in 1986 in how Congress handles the debate of war and peace in Central America, on the issues of escalation or negotiation as the path of U.S. policy for the region.

Concerned citizens across the country—on both sides of the debate—may very well play a deciding role in how Congress will respond to the crisis in Central America in 1986. Religious, labor, and professional groups as well as other constituencies that have been critical of U.S. policy must now realize that they are no longer the only voice being heard on this issue, especially on Nicaragua and aid to the contras.

There is not only the need for rapid and expanded community outreach, but the need to translate that broad and growing opposition into a visible and vocal expression of community opinion for all members of Congress to see and hear. To turn the tide of debate will take massive grassroots involvement with elected officials over the next seven to ten months. The necessary foundation for that will always be on-going letter-writing campaigns, local delegation visits to representatives and senators, questions at public forums and town meetings, as well as letters and telegrams at times of key votes. But it can also include city and state resolution campaigns, cities declaring themselves sanctuaries, state-wide town meetings and a host of other events aimed at demonstrating to Congress that public opinion remains opposed to the current policies of policy in Central America.

In the upcoming Winter Issue of *Close-Up*, the Coalition will shore several action campaigns to help shape the debate on Central America in 1986.

## Central America Resources

**Human Rights in Nicaragua: Reagan, Rhetoric and Reality** by the Americas Watch Committee, July 1985. Anyone who is doing work on Nicaragua or on U.S. human rights policy must read this latest AWC report which analyzes point-by-point all charges made by the Reagan administration against Nicaragua on human rights issues. Includes an analysis of abuses by the contras, as well. Order from: AWC, 36 West 44th Street, New York, NY 10036.

**Inside Central America: The Essential Facts Past and Present on El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica**, by Phil Berryman. A comprehensive and easy-to-read handbook that describes the context of current conflicts, analyzes current U.S. policy and projects possible avenues for peace and negotiations. Pantheon Books, New York. \$5.95. Available in most bookstores.

**Witness to War: An American Doctor in El Salvador**, Skylight Pictures, 1985. 30-minute, color film (16mm and video) about Charlie Clements in Vietnam as an Air Force pilot and his life as a doctor in El Salvador. \$60 rental from: First Run Features, 153 Waverly Place, New York, NY 10014.

**On A Short Fuse: Militarization in Central America** by the Caribbean Basin Information Project, 1985. Easy-to-use source of vital data on U.S. security assistance, military presence, and balance of forces in Central America. \$4.00/copy, good bulk rates. Order from: CBIP/Tides Foundation, 1826 18th St. NW, Washington, DC 20009.

**Invasion: A Guide to the U.S. Military Presence in Central America** by NARMIC, 1985. Documents U.S. military build-up in Central America and the Caribbean. \$2.00/copy. NARMIC/AFSC, 1501 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102.





## South Africa

### Update

We have enjoyed relative success in the sphere of anti-apartheid work this session; however, our victories are in part a response to the rapidly worsening conflict in South Africa.

We have managed to legislate a major departure from the Reagan policy of constructive engagement with both houses of Congress having agreed on limited economic sanctions against the South African government. The conference committee agreed on July 31st to a compromise between HR 1460 on the House side (see Boxscore) and S 995 from the Senate. Additional sanctions such as a ban on new U.S. investments in South Africa, prohibition of uranium and/or coal imports or denial of South Africa's most favored nation tariff status will be imposed if South Africa does not meet at least one out of eight measures of progress. These measures include a release of all political prisoners, the total halt of forced removals, and granting full citizenship rights to black South Africans.

Unfortunately, the Senate was unable to vote on the conference report before the August recess and Senator Helms has promised to filibuster the vote on the Senate floor so the bill will not get to the president's desk until sometime in September. Then, of course, there is the possibility of a Reagan veto, although the Senate leadership appears confident that he will reluctantly sign the sanctions bill.

### What Lies Ahead?

The battle over the pending anti-apartheid legislation is not over. We have to contend with the delaying tactics of Senator Helms (R-NC) and his allies. The responsibility for getting the bill to the president ultimately falls on the Senate leadership and, in particular, Senators Dole, Lugar, and Kassebaum. We must pressure them to act expeditiously. Obviously, if the president chooses to veto the bill, we will have to focus our energies on getting the vote for an override.

Once we have secured this bill, the next piece of legislation up for consideration will be in regard to Namibia. Representative Pat Schroeder (D-CO) has introduced a bill in the House forbidding the mining of Namibian minerals by U.S. firms. We will need to get a

Senate sponsor and work to raise again the whole question of South Africa's illegal rule over Namibia.

We must also continue our efforts at the state and local level. We must not be distracted any longer by the myth that American companies can be a force for change in South Africa and we must reject the Sullivan Principles as a camouflage for corporate complicity with apartheid. The victories at the local level represent the growing momentum of the anti-apartheid movement; we must continue to press for unqualified disinvestment of the grassroots in part so that our sponsors at the national level will have the basis for offering stronger legislation in the next Congressional session.

## South Africa Resources

**Economic Action Against Apartheid: An Overview of the Divestment Campaign and Financial Implications for Institutional Investors**, by Brooke Baldwin and Theodore Brown. Published by The Africa Fund (associated with the American Committee on Africa). This 50 page booklet presents a summary of U.S. anti-apartheid actions taken in the past few years as well as an economic analysis of divestment, including a comparison of investment portfolios. \$3 each.

**The Unified List of American Companies Operating in South Africa**. Published by The Africa Fund (associated with the American Committee on Africa). The authoritative list of American companies that have subsidiaries in South Africa, compiled from all available sources. \$5 plus \$1 for postage.

**One Step in the Wrong Direction: An Analysis of the Sullivan Principles as a Strategy for Opposing Apartheid**. This booklet provides a principle by principle critique as well as an analysis of the most recent Sullivan rating/report on U.S. companies which are signatory to the Principles. By Elizabeth Schmidt. Published by Episcopal Churchpeople for a Free Southern Africa. \$1 each. Order from: ECSA, 339 Lafayette Street, New York, NY 10012; (212) 477-0066.

**A Guide to Films on Apartheid** by Medio Network. Lists over 40 films, videotapes and slide shows. Includes title, length, format, producer, price, distributor and a description of the film. \$2.50 each. Order from Medio Network, c/o Alternative Medio and Information Center, 208 West 13th Street, New York, NY 10011.



Bullwhips in hand, South African police attack antiapartheid protesters outside the Athlone stadium near Cape Town

TURNLEY—DETROIT FREE PRESS/BLACK STAR



# BOXSCORE

**Senate Aid to the Contras.** On June 6, 1985, amendment by Nunn (D-GA) and Lugar (R-IN) to send \$38 million in "humanitarian" aid to the Nicaraguan contras to be monitored by the National Security Council and administered by the CIA. Approved 55-42.

**House Aid to the Contras.** On June 12, 1985, during debate on the FY 85 Supplemental Appropriations bill, amendment by Michel (R-IL) and McDade (R-PA) to provide \$27 million in "humanitarian" aid to the Nicaraguan contras between now and March 31, 1986, to be administered by a U.S. agency other than the CIA or the Department of Defense. Approved 248-184.

voted down. Dellums (D-CA) for a \$954 million limit rejected 102-320; Movroules (D-MA) for a \$1.4 billion limit rejected 155-268; Dicks (D-WA) for a \$2.1 billion limit rejected 195-221.

**ASAT (Anti-Satellite) Missile Tests**—Brown (D-CA) amendment to prohibit ASAT tests as long as the Russians refrain from testing adopted 229-193, June 26.

**Chemical Weapons**—Skelton (D-MO) amendment to nullify the Porter (R-IL) amendment which would have prohibited binary chemical weapons production. Skelton passed (Porter nullified) 229-196, June 19.

**Trident D-5 Missile**—Weiss (D-NY) amendment to prohibit production of Trident II (D-5) rejected 79-342, June 19.

THE WASHINGTON TIMES  
GRIFFIN



## Senate:

**MX Missile**—Hart (D-CO) amendment to kill 1986 MX production funds failed 42-56, May 21.

**Star Wars Research**—On June 4, two amendments to reduce funding below the \$2.96 billion committee recommendation were voted down. Kerry (D-MA) for a \$1.4 billion limit rejected 21-78; Proxmire (D-WI) for a \$1.9 billion limit, rejected 38-57.

**ASAT (Anti-Satellite) Missile Tests**—Kerry (D-MA) amendment to prohibit ASAT tests as long as the Russians refrain from testing rejected 35-51, May 24.

**Chemical Weapons**—Pryor (D-AR) amendment to prevent binary chemical weapons production rejected 46-50, May 22.

## House:

**MX Missile**—McCurdy (D-OK) amendment to cap the number of deployed MX missiles at 40 adopted 233-184, June 18.

**Star Wars Research**—On June 20, three attempts to reduce funding below the \$2.5 billion committee recommendations were



1) **On June 11**, Senator Symms (R-ID) introduced an amendment to the State Department Authorization Act which called for the repeal of the Clark Amendment. The Clark Amendment prohibited any aid—overt or covert—to the anti-government rebels in Angola. Senator Symms' amendment passed the Senate by a vote of 63-34. On July 10, the House passed an identical amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill, introduced by Rep. Sam Stratton (D-NY). They passed the repeal by a vote of 236 to 185.

2) **On June 4th**, the House voted on the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 (HR 1460). The bill discontinues further corporate investment in South Africa, bans the importation of Krugerrands and prohibits computer and nuclear trade with the South African regime. The bill passed by a vote of 295 to 127 with 56 Republicans voting in favor of the bill.

3) **On July 11**, the Senate passed the Anti-Apartheid Action Act of 1985 (S 995) by a vote of 80-12. The bill discontinues bank loans to the South African government and prohibits computer and nuclear trade with the South African regime. Otherwise, it puts on an eighteen month ban on any sanctions after which time the president can determine whether or not the South African government has made progress towards reform.

4) **On July 31st**, the Senate and the House agreed in conference on an anti-apartheid bill. The legislation if signed by the president, would put on immediate ban on the importation of Krugerrands, discontinue bank loans to the South African government and forbid computer and nuclear trade with the South African regime.



# NUTS AND BOLTS



for organizers

**Erica Foldy, Field Director**

What makes your members of Congress tick? If you can answer this question—why they choose to vote as they do—you will be much better able to influence their votes.

The final casting of a vote is the culmination of a complex process during which the member weighs constituent opinion, requests from a variety of individuals, and his or her own beliefs. Beset by demands from every quarter, representatives and senators are forced to choose among conflicting pressures. An understanding of the pressures faced by your member will help you tailor your work to have the greatest effect. One way to look at these pressures is to look at the many different roles that a legislator plays. All legislators play all these roles at one time or another. On any single vote, one or two roles may become primary and determine the final decision.

The idea of roles is especially useful because we can design our work so that it appeals to the role we think will be most important on a particular vote. Here is a list of roles that congresspeople play and the kind of approach that would be most useful.

**The statesman (or stateswoman):** When playing this role, a legislator is concerned about whether a bill is the best policy for the country as a whole. The legislator will consider the benefits and drawbacks then decide on the basis of his or her own personal politics, perhaps influenced by thoughtful discussion or written materials. Unfortunately, legislators don't play this role nearly as often as we might like. One study of Congress found (not surprisingly) that members ranked getting re-elected and advancing their career before policy concerns when judging how to vote.

If you decide that your member is making policy concerns a prime consideration, then you would want to present him or her with detailed information. You could send copies of magazine and newspaper articles or research studies or set up a meeting between your legislator and an individual versed in the issue or with some direct personal experience (like a constituent recently returned from Central America).

Cultivating a relationship with a legislative aide can also be key here. If the member is inaccessible, make sure that the aide receives all the information to pass on to his or her boss. One note of warning: usually only one or two aides in the office have real influence with the member. Try to identify and approach these people rather than relying only on the aide assigned to your issue area. Very often the administrative aide, the legislator's top aide, has more influence.

**A Representative:** Here legislators are representing the interests and opinions of their half a million constituents. When we generate calls and letters to a congressional office, this is the role we are addressing.

Members are likely to argue that yours is a minority position and not representative of the district as a whole. You may have to do some work to show that you are not marginal.

The legislator may try to position him or herself as a moderate, in the center between left and right. In this case, you need to find out if there is an organized opposition to your work on an issue. Who are they? From what part of the district? What are their arguments and tactics?

Try to reach out to the entire district with your message, thus showing that you do have wide support. Districts generally have conservative and liberal pockets. For example, congressional offices will often discount the mail they receive from the university towns in their district, seeing them as out-of-step with the rest of their constituents. Do the unexpected: generate letters from conservative areas. Figure out where the legislator's base of support is (Where was he or she raised? Where does he or she live?) and generate letters from there.

Finally, speak to opinion leaders in the area. Seek out those individuals who are respected in the community and have a following, people who are clearly in the mainstream of the community. If they will speak to the legislator on the issue, it will be more apparent that your position is also mainstream.



**A Broker:** A legislator will act as a broker for special interests or for constituencies in his or her district, particularly those considered to be an important base of support. He or she will give particular attention to legislation which affects these groups and expect their support in return. Are there any such groups who could play a key role on the upcoming legislation you are working on? Could they approach the representative? A new messenger will highlight the message and such groups can't be dismissed as marginal.

**A Party Member:** Legislators, of course, play an important role in their party on the local, state, and national levels. They identify themselves as members of their party. They act as boosters and spokespeople. The party is also their political base and crucial for any further political work they wish to do, so they need to heed its voice.

In Congress, members will often take their cue from the party leadership. A request from the Speaker, the President, or the Minority Leader can certainly overrule any amount of mail coming in from the district. At home, legislators may very well listen to their local party, since they will rely on it to provide much of the organizational muscle and funding for any future campaigns. It is very useful, therefore, to become involved in your local party and see how it operates. If the party is more progressive than the legislator, pressure could be brought to bear. During the many battles on the MX, some local and state parties put great pressure on representatives to stand with the party's explicit opposition to the missile. If there are influential members of the party who agree with your position, their opinions might be seriously considered by the representative.

**A Candidate:** Representatives, particularly, are perennial candidates. They will be continually fundraising and working their area to enhance their next candidacy. They will also be positioning themselves in relation to their next opponent. They may very well weigh their vote on a bill extra carefully during the campaign season since they want to send just the right message to the voters. You will find it helpful to find out who the expected challenger will be. Is he or she to the right or left of the representative? How might the representative modify his or her position, given the opposition?

Campaign funders have a disproportionate influence on how legislators vote. It is very easy to find out the individuals and political action committees (PACs) that fund your legislators' campaigns: write the Federal Election Commission, 1325 K St., NW, Washington, DC 20463 or call 800/424-9530 to ask for a computer print-out of the individuals and PACs that gave money in the last election (you can get it for earlier elections also). Once you



have the list, find out which individuals, families, businesses and organizations are the most prominent supporters. Who among them is an open, or potential, booster of peace and justice issues?

**A Regular Person:** Because legislators are in the limelight so much, sometimes we forget that they also lead private lives: they have family, friends, colleagues in social and civic organizations, and informal advisors. Very often, these are the most influential people of all. I have heard of members being lobbied by moids, dentists, former business associates, and their children's teachers. One representative was even approached by the priest who performed his wedding ceremony. It is difficult to find out who these people are and then gain access to them, but not impossible. Congressional districts are not so big—most likely, someone you know through church, work, or social organizations has some tie with the representative.

All representatives and senators are required to file personal financial disclosure forms and these can give useful information. They list income, gifts, honoraria, positions held within organizations, and a variety of other data. Write to the House Office of Records and Registration, House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515, or to the Senate Office of Public Records, Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510, to ask for your legislators' financial disclosure forms.

As you can see, lobbying doesn't have to be limited to simply writing letters and visiting your representative. There are many ways to inform and pressure your legislators; the key is to find the one which will make the most difference at a crucial time. Do the work necessary to really understand your members of Congress and it will pay off in the end.

## New from the Coalition

The *World Policy Journal* and reprints from the journal are now available from the Coalition.

- *World Policy Journal* Summer 1985 - \$4.75  
Articles by: Moffit, Thoyer, Konrod, Arkin and Chappell, plus several more.
- *World Policy Reprints* - \$2.00  
"How to Start Ending the Arms Race" - Robert C. Johnson  
"Forging Missiles into Spaceships" - Daniel Deudney  
"Beyond the Blocs: Defending Europe the Political Way" - Mary Koldor
- *World Policy Paper* - \$3.00  
"Toward an Alternative Security System" - Robert C. Johnson

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## ORDER COALITION MATERIALS

The following resources are available from the Coalition to educate citizens on foreign policy issues. Use them at meetings, forums, and information tables.

_____	How to Follow Congress on Central America	_____
_____	U.S. Aid to El Salvador (.50 ea.)	_____
_____	U.S. and Soviet "First-Strike" Capabilities	_____
_____	Central American 1985 (briefing book) 350 pp., \$20	_____
_____	1984 Voting Record	_____
_____	The Facts About Military Spending	_____
_____	Economic Benefits of the Freeze (revised 1984) (leaflet)	_____
_____	The Other Side of the Coin: Feeding the Military and Starving the Poor (leaflet)	_____
_____	The Costs and Consequences of Reagan's Military Build-Up (54 pp., \$2.50)	_____
_____	Dangerous Deception: Civil Defense Planning in the Nuclear Age (brochure)	_____
_____	"First-Strike" Nuclear Weapons (slide show, \$50.00)	_____
_____	More Jobs (brochure)	_____
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Prices: Brochures, pamphlets, 1-25, .25 ea.; 25 or more, .12 ea. or \$12/100; leaflets 1-25, .10 ea.; 26 or more, .05 ea. or \$5/100; plus 20% shipping (UPS) and handling. All orders under \$5 must be prepaid. Return to **Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy**, 712 G Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003. 202-546-8400.

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## JOIN THE COALITION NETWORK

☐ **YES!** Sign me up for the Coalition's network and send me regular updates on key legislation, plus resources on the issues for local organizing work. Here's \$20 for one year of Coalition materials. I would also like to receive: ☐ Campaign Against U.S. Intervention: Legislative Update.

☐ Here's \$2 for more information about the Coalition.

☐ I would like to make an additional contribution to support the Coalition's public education and organizing work. (Tax deductible contributions can be made payable to the Foreign Policy Education Fund) ☐ \$100 ☐ \$50 ☐ \$25 ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_

☐ I've enclosed a list of people who may be interested in the Coalition. Please send them information. (Check here ☐ if you do not want us to use your name when we write them.)

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Please make checks payable to the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, 712 G Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003.

The Coalition unites 55 national religious, professional, peace, research, and social action organizations for a peaceful, non-interventionist and demilitarized U.S. foreign policy. Combining grassroots constituent organizing with coordinated activity on Capitol Hill, the Coalition works to reduce military spending, protect human rights, promote arms control and disarmament, support majority rule and authentic self-determination in southern Africa and promote normalized relations and economic and humanitarian assistance to the Indochina area.

The Coalition is helping to build a powerful citizen's movement for a new foreign policy for the U.S. We want you to join us!

The following organizations are members of the Coalition: American Baptist Church, USA, National Ministries • American Committee on Africa • American Ethical Union • American Friends Service Committee • American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee • Americans for Democratic Action • Center for International Policy • Center of Concern • Church of the Brethren, Washington Office • Christian Church (Disciples of

Christ) Department of Church and Society • Church Women United • Clergy and Laity Concerned • Congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Cross • Council on Hemispheric Affairs • Democratic Socialists of America • Episcopal Peace Fellowship • Fellowship of Reconciliation • Friends Committee on National Legislation • Friends of the Earth • Friends of the Filipino People • Institute for Food and Development Policy • Mennonite Central Committee U.S. Peace Section • Movement for a Free Philippines • National Assembly of Religious Women • National Association of Social Workers • National Council of Churches • National Federation of Priests' Councils, USA • National Gray Panthers • National Office of Jesuit Social Ministries • NETWORK • New Jewish Agenda • North American Federation of Temple Youth • OXFAM America • Presbyterian Church (USA), Washington Office • Presbyterian Peace Fellowship • Quixote Center • SANE • Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace • Union of American Hebrew Congregations • Unitarian Universalist Association • Unitarian Universalist Service Committee • United Church of Christ, Board for Homeland Ministries • United Church of Christ, Office of Church in Society • United Methodist Church, Board of Church and Society • United Methodist Church, Board of Global Ministries, Women's Division • United States Student Association • War Resisters League • Washington Office of the Episcopal Church • Washington Office on Africa • Washington Office on Latin America • Women's International League for Peace and Freedom • Women Strike for Peace • World Federalist Association • World Peacemakers • Young Women's Christian Association of the USA.

### CHANGING YOUR ADDRESS:

When you change your address, please print your complete old and new addresses on a card and attach a copy of your mailing label. It takes longer to make the correct change without this information.

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